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Summary
The Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme was first
introduced in 1976-77. by the Eraser Coalition Government. It is currently being
reviewed by a team appointed by the Howard Government. The paper discusses
the genesis of the scheme, its nature, past reviews and its survival and expansion.
The major achievements of the CDEP scheme include:
• its undiminished popularity;
• its sheersurvival;
• its ability to create a mechanism to facilitate productive activity in many
contexts; and
• its ability (and potential) to supplement low cash incomes that would
otherwise hit a very low welfare ceiling, especially in remote, relatively
underdeveloped, regions.
Limitations of the CDEP scheme include:
• the lack of tangible and convincing evidence of success, be it in income
supplementation, employment creation, community development or
enterprise creation;
• its inability to provide training to scheme participants and participating
organisations;
• the absence of well-defined exit options; and
• ongoing administrative problems, especially in maintaining accurate
participant schedules.
^This paper suggests that the future survival of the CDEP scheme
• a concerted government focus on the resolution of a number of marginal
eligibility issues;
• the relative performance of the mainstream work-for-the-dole scheme as a
benchmark that may highlight the efficiency or inefficiency of the CDEP
scheme;
• significant rearrangement so that the employment creation and income
supplementation objectives can be clearly differentiated from the income
support and community development(welfare substitution) objectives;and
• clearly distinguishing scheme participants that work from non-working
participants who are usually spouses of workers.
Addressing these major issues may require some reduction in the current
independence afforded participating communities in deciding how CDEP scheme
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funding allocations are divided. While such community autonomy is a major
strength of the scheme from the indigenous perspective, it is also resulting in a
wide diversity in outcomes that is making rigorous evaluation and associated
allocation of discretionary resources extremely problematic.
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Introduction
The Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme was first
introduced in 1976-77, by the Eraser Coalition Government. It is not often that an
academic commentator has the opportunity to assess the achievements and
limitations of a government program after some 20 years of relatively unchanged
operation.
While this discussion paper is ostensibly an assessment of the past, it is
also very much about the future. This is partly because the CDEP scheme is
currently (late 1997) being reviewed by a team appointed by the Howard
Government. The paper begins with a somewhat lengthy contextualising
discussion about the genesis of the scheme, its nature, past reviews and its
survival and expansion. Under the broad rubric of achievements and limitations,
four issues are then examined: the scheme's popularity, the multiple objectives of
the scheme, the various components of the scheme and the administration of the
scheme. In looking at the important challenges for the future, those that are
unavoidable are differentiated from the avoidable.
Contextualising the CDEP scheme: a brief overview
To begin, it is important to attempt to explain what the CDEP scheme is, and how
it might have changed over its first 20 years. At one level, with reference to inputs
of dollars and outputs of participants these questions can be relatively easily
answered. At another level, though, with reference to outcomes, these question
prove to be extremely problematic.
The CDEP scheme started in 1977 on a pilot basis at the remote Aboriginal
community of Bamyili (now Wugularr) in the Northern Territory; in 1977-78 its
coverage was extended to several Pitjantjatjara communities in South Australia
and Western Australia. The scheme evolved as a direct consequence of the
introduction of award wages at remote Aboriginal communities by the Whitlam
Labor Government. Previously, Aboriginal people had been employed on below
award 'training allowances'; with the introduction of award wages, primarily for a
limited number of town management jobs, unemployment was created.
Concerned by the possibility that a combination of inactivity and access to
unemployment benefits might create social problems (Department of Aboriginal
Affairs (DAA) 1977), a decision was made to pilot a 'work-for-the-dole' scheme at
remote Aboriginal communities. Communities that initially participated in the
scheme had not been in receipt of unemployment benefits (as Newstart Allowance
(NSA) was then called). The basis of the scheme is for residents of participating
communities to forego their entitlements to unemployment benefits. An amount
roughly equivalent to the value of these entitlements is then paid to each
community quarterly; participating organisations (or community councils) then
either pay wages out of this resources pool for part-time employment or provide
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income support to non-working participants. Initially, the scheme also provided
an additional 10 per cent (of the lump sum) to cover administrative and capital
on-costs.
The history of the growth of the scheme is complex and this paper will not
focus In any great detail on this 20-year history (see Sanders 1988;Altman and
Sanders 1991a; Sanders 1993; and Sanders 1997a for periodic updates). Over the
years the fundamentals of the scheme have changed little: on-costs increased
from 10 per cent to 20 per cent in the early 1980s; a new capital support
component equivalent to up to another 20 per cent was introduced as part of the
Hawke Government's Aboriginal Employment Development Policy (AEDP) initiative
In 1987;and the scheme has been increasingly introduced to urban, non-discrete
communities from the late 1980s. Four key features of the scheme are
noteworthy:
• it is largely funded from the notional NSA (and in some cases supporting
parent pension) entitlements of participants;
• participation in the scheme does not necessarily mean employment (or
unemployment) in official statistical collections; some participants are
recorded as employed, some as unemployed or as 'not-in-the-labour-force':
such distinctions are largely the decision of participating communities or
data collectors;
• there are differences between rural and remote discrete communities, where
participation in the scheme means that NSA is not available to community
members as an alternative source of income support, and major urban and
other urban communities where the scheme is run on a project basis and
NSA is available to non-participants; and finally
• the scheme is more generous in terms of income testing than either NSA or
pensions: the average per participant rate of about $170at present can be
doubled again (that is, $510 per week can be earned) before eligibility to
participate in the scheme ceases. (However, there are no administrative data
estimating individual incomes or identifying any participants being deemed
ineligible because they earn too much.)
On the outcomes side, the scheme is far more difficult to define, primarily
because it has multiple objectives that can be variably interpreted both by
participating communities and administering bureaucrats. Possible
interpretations include the following:
• the CDEP scheme is Australia's longest running relatively unaltered labour
market program. As data presented below will show, its sheer scale,
especially in the overall indigenous affairs context, is impressive. If job
creation is the goal then outcomes need to be measured by the number of
participants exiting the scheme to employment. This information has never
been systematically collected and there are no examples of communities
proactively exiting the scheme;
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• it is Australia's most generous minimum income support program. If this
were the case then it is important to demonstrate the scheme's
effectiveness, either in providing income support (for non-working
participants) or as a means to facilitate income generation (for working
participants);
• it is an enterprise development program. If so. case outcomes should
demonstrate the extent to which the scheme has assisted the establishment
of viable enterprises; and
• it is a community development program, in which case outcomes should
indicate the positive social impacts of the scheme on participating
communities compared to others.
Over the years the scheme has been variably interpreted and it is
increasingly recognised as having multiple objectives. It is able to do this in part
because as Sanders (1988, 1993, 1997a) has noted it sits, at times somewhat
uncomfortably, across the great divide in Australian social policy between welfare
(income support) and workfare (employment creation). The scheme's growth in
recent years has been very rapid, reflecting its popularity among both Aboriginal
communities (often as Hobson's choice—the CDEP scheme, NSAor not much else)
and politicians of all persuasions.
The growth in CDEP scheme participation has occurred despite numerous
reviews that have cautioned against expansion until a number of administrative
and policy issues are resolved. Just three illustrative examples will suffice:
• in 1986. a national review by the DAA (DAA 1986) noted that the scheme
was tailor-made for particular circumstances at a particular point in time
and recommended emphatically that the scheme's geographic coverage
should not extend to urban communities. In the late 1980s, it did just that;
• in 1990, an interdepartmental review (CDEP Working Party 1990: vi)
focusing on the nexus between welfare entitlements and CDEP scheme
entitlements recommended an immediate slow down in the scheme's
expansion 'to allow numerous policy and administrative issues to be
resolved', but to no avail; and
• in 1993, an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC)
commissioned consultancy report titled No Reverse Gear (Deloitte Touche
Tohmatsu 1993) recommended, again to no avail, a slow down in the
scheme's expansion and a focus on clearly defining its multiple objectives.
When this discussion paper was being written the scheme was again the
subject of a major review being conducted by an inter-agency task force chaired
by the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation's Ian Spicer. This review is driven,
according to its terms of reference, by a combination of the following:
• a government concern that people are not exiting the scheme to the private
sector, to training, to education or to joint ventures;
• industrial relations issues;
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• the costs of administering the scheme, often in monopolistic organisational
environments;
• the need to assess the scheme's operations now that ATSIC regional
councils have assumed the key role in distributing discretionary scheme-
linked resources (that is, the capital or CDEP Support component of the
scheme):
• issues associated with management training and support to participating
organisations;
• the absence of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms; and
• the issue of whether CDEP scheme participants and Department of Social
Security (DSS) beneficiaries are treated equally.
Historically, the scheme has been able to expand in different contexts, at
different times, because it has received important endorsement, surprisingly often
with reservations, from influential reviews with particular focuses. For example:
• the major review of Aboriginal employment and training programs in 1985
(Miller 1985) highlighted the great potential of the scheme to underwrite
enterprise development, especially in rural and remote communities where
there are few commercial opportunities;
• the policy response to the Miller Report was the AEDP officially launched in
1987 (Australian Government 1987). It provided a five-year funding
commitment to the expansion of the scheme as an important means to
support the AEDP's goal of employment equality between indigenous and
other Australians. By 1991, it was clear that CDEP scheme growth was far
exceeding AEDP targets (Altman and Sanders 1991b: 13);
• the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs In
Its homelands Inquiry Return to Country (Commonwealthof Australia 1987)
highlighted both the 'positive impact of the CDEP scheme on outstation
development and the absence of alternate employment at these remote
communities; and
• the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Commonwealth of
Australia 1991) endorsed the role that the scheme played in community
development and social cohesion by providing options for people to partake
In productive activity. This was seen as a very cost-effective way to keep
people outside the criminal justice system.
At the same time, while all this expansion has been going on, there has
been concern expressed, especially at the macro-policy level, about the scheme.
This has emanated primarily from academic commentators and consultants.
Some illustrative examples include:
• In 1990, when participating in an interdepartmental review of the scheme,
concerns were raised about the lack of rigorous scheme performance
evaluation (Altman 1990). Without such assessment it was impossible to
assess if scheme expenditure represented the best use of scarce Aboriginal
affairs dollars;
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• in 1993, No Reverse Gear (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 1993) undertook
research and collected important primary data at 21 CDEP scheme
communities. The review highlighted problems with the multiple objectives
of the scheme and also noted that the scheme's communitydevelopment
role, particularly in the areas of housing and infrastructure provision, may
have allowed governments to renege on their funding responsibilities; and
• research at the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR)
since 1990has continually raised concerns that while the scheme might be
assisting government policy objectives by providing part-time employment, it
was also locking participants into poverty (Altaian and Sanders 1991b;
Altaian and Smith 1994; Altaian and Hunter 1997). Concern has also been
expressed about participants' vulnerability to policy change, budget cuts or
capping of expansion (Altaian and Daly 1992; Hunter and Taylor 1996).2
In 1993, after analysing past reviews and unresolved administrative and
policy issues, Sanders (1993) wrote a discussion paper titled The rise and rise of
the CDEP scheme' about the scheme's inevitable growth. It will be interesting to
see if, in the aftermath of this latest review, we will again see another 'rise'
without major change in the scheme's structure or operations.
Achievements and limitations
Achievements and limitations of the scheme under four broad headings are now
examined. Owing to the absence of incontestable and quantitative performance
indicators for the scheme, assessments are somewhat interpretative and the
choice of key issues is certainly highly subjective.
The scheme's popularity
Perhaps the greatest achievement of the scheme has been its longevity and
its growth. This is clearly illustrated in Table 1 where information is provided for
20 years on the number of participating communities, scheme participants,
expenditure (in current not real dollars) and the proportion of total specific
expenditure in indigenous affairs on the scheme. This growth reflects the
scheme's undeniable popularity: it is an indicator of 'success'.
The political popularity of the scheme, at all levels, can be readily explained.
Indigenous community leaders like the scheme because it provides them with
control over considerably more discretionary resources than would be available
under a welfare regime. It also affords Aboriginal community politicians a rare
opportunity to take the high moral ground: 'we work for our dole in contrast to
other Australians' (seeAltaian and Sanders 199la; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
1993).3
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Table 1. CDEP scheme participant numbers and expenditure, 1976-96a
Year
1976/77
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96
1996/97
Number of
communities
participating
1
10
12
17
18
18
18
32
33
38
63
92
130
166
168
185
186
222
252
274
268
Number
cf
participants
100
500
800
700
1,300
1,300
1,300
1,700
2,900
4,000
6,000
7,600
10,800
13,800
18,100
20,100
19,900
24,100
27,000
28,400
30,000
CDEP
expenditure
($ million)
0.1
2.0
2.9
3.8
6.9
7.0
7.4
14.2
23.5
27.2
39.5
65.5
98.8
133.2
193.1
204.5
234.4
251.9
278.3
326.6
345.3
CDEP as %
of portfolio
expenditure
<1
2
2
3
4
4
4
6
8
9
12
17
22
25
34
32
28
27
29
32
35
Note: a. Data are divided by ATSIC between Torres Strait Regional Authority allocations and the
rest of the nation; these two components are aggregated here. Rounded-off
approximations only.
Source: Sanders (1997a): ATSIC (1997b)
State and local government politicians like the scheme because it provides
Commonwealth financial resourcing to partially underwrite Aboriginal community
development, especially at very remote and very small communities like
outstations. Federal politicians like the scheme because, as will be illustrated
below, it ameliorates extraordinarily high rates of indigenous unemployment.
The popularity-linked success of the scheme at these political levels is
hardly surprising, but some research also suggests that there are rumblings from
participants, especially long-term participants who may have participated in the
scheme for up to 20 years for intractably low part-time wages or non-working
participants who may be receiving less under the scheme than under welfare
(Smith, Adams and Burgen 1990; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 1993; Sanders
1997a).
More substantively, available case study research invariably indicates that if
the scheme is well administered it can actually make a difference to the quality of
life at participating communities (see Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 1993; Smith
1994. 1995, 1996). This is a major achievement.
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Multiple objectives
It is difficult to assess whether the multiple objectives of the scheme are an
achievement or a limitation depending on whether each objective is separately
assessed or whether this feature of the scheme is globally assessed. Let me begin
with three (among many) individual components.
Historically, the scheme began largely as an alternative means to provide
income support to participants in remote communities. Its effectiveness in
meeting this objective is highly variable. Available information suggests that
between 60 per cent (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 1993) and 71 per cent
(ABS/CAEPR 1996) of CDEP participants work part-time for wages. Analysis by
ATSIC (1996: 59-61) of the activities undertaken by CDEP scheme workers
indicates that many undertake similar activities (like art and craft production,
subsistence, and so on) that they might have under a welfare regime. A key issue
is whether non-working participants receive the equivalent of their welfare
entitlements when the community in which they reside participates in the
scheme. This is an issue that is examined in greater detail in by Sanders (1997b);
suffice to say that it is possible that non-working scheme participants are more
vulnerable to receive less than their welfare entitlements because there is a degree
of community discretion about how block grants are expended. This is a potential,
and important, limitation of the scheme.
More recently, the scheme has increasingly been regarded as a labour
market program: in the context of the AEDP, the scheme's rapid expansion since
1987-88 has largely been predicated on its employment creation potential. In a
statistical sense, the CDEP scheme has been very successful in meeting this
objective. In Table 2. estimates are provided about the impact of the CDEP
scheme on official estimates of indigenous employment since 1986. It is
calculated that between 1986 and 1991 indigenous employment expanded by
some 14,900; of this 64 per cent was created by expansion in CDEP scheme
employment and only 36 per cent by other 'real' job growth. In short, CDEP
employment increased at 2,000 per annum or twice the non-CDEP growth of
1,000 jobs per annum. Between 1986 and 1991, CDEP scheme employment
expanded from 7.5 per cent of all indigenous employment to 21.4 per cent. More
recently, it is estimated that CDEP employment accounts for over 23 per cent of
indigenous employment. While statistically this is an achievement, it is important
to recall that most of this employment is part-time and for relatively low wages. It
is also employment that is dependent on annual appropriations; its vulnerability
was demonstrated by budget cuts introduced by the Howard Government in 1996
(Hunter and Taylor 1996).
A constant criticism of the scheme in recent years (see Johnston 1991), and
one of its key limitations, is its inability to provide training both to scheme
participants and participating organisations. There is no ready mechanism
available to allow employed participants to move on and off training programs,
although as Smith's (1994, 1996) case studies indicate some particular CDEP
organisations have creatively found means to provide some training to
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participants. Similarly, a fundamental weakness of the scheme is its inability to
assist managers and administrators to use the scheme creatively or to find means
to access training programs for 'employed' participants. This difficulty is largely
due to interagency program demarcations, that the AEDP was meant to straddle;
it may also be due to an unwillingness or financial inability for CDEP
organisations to buy-in expertise.
Table 2. CDEP scheme participation and impact on indigenous
employment, 1986-96
CDEP participants
CDEP employed
Employed (E)
Non-CDEP E
CDEP share of E
1986
5,000
3,500
46,900
43.400
7.5%
1991
18,500
13,200
61,800
48,600
21.4%
1994
24,000
17,000
66,600
49,600
25.5%
1996
26,228
18,622
82,000
63,378
22.7%
Source: Altaian (1997)
Overall, though, the multiple objectives of the scheme and the discretion
given to participating communities to define work and to independently decide on
allocation of funds, within certain parameters, is one of the scheme's great
advantages. In situations where there are often very limited mainstream labour
market opportunities, participation in the scheme is convenient (there is no
constant scrutiny by DSS. no fortnightly work test and no need for diaries) and
the fact that participating communities are allowed the dignity to define what
constitutes 'work' allows for culturally and locationally appropriate definitions of
employment.
Components of the CDEP scheme
While the total cost of the scheme now exceeds $300 million per annum,
one of ATSIC's important achievements has been an ability to maintain a link
between an estimated 63 per cent of this expenditure and their notional welfare
entitlements from DSS. The key achievement here is largely political and explains
to some extent the longevity of the scheme: over 60 per cent of the cost of the
scheme, and arguably a proportion more, is a sunken cost for government that
would need to be paid, via NSA, anyway. Indeed, there are some arguments that
there are other net savings to government because, as low-paid employed people,
CDEP participants miss out on some benefits that they would have received as
welfare recipients (Sanders 1997b).
The scheme's funding is divided into three components comprising
participants' wages; recurrent on-costs that are used to administer the scheme
and to meet statutorily required costs like workers compensation insurance
premiums; and capital costs. The division between these three categories is
shown for the last two financial years in Table 3. As a general rule, recurrent on-
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costs are calculated as an additional 20 per cent on the wages component and
capital is estimated as about 15 per cent on wages. On a percentage basis, wages
account for 74 per cent, recurrent to 15 per cent and capital for 11 per cent.
Actual allocations in 1995-96 and 1996-97 are close to these proportions.
Table 3. CDEP scheme expenditure by broad components,1995-96 and
1996-97*
Yearb
1995-96
(allocated)
1995-96
(released)
1996-97
(allocated)
1996-97
(released)
$m
Per cent
$m
Per cent
$m
Per cent
$m
Per cent
Wages
component
239.4
74.0
242.4
74.3
257.4
74.4
257.3
74.5
Recurrent
on-costs
46.3
14.3
65.7
20.1
49.3
14.2
68.4
19.8
Capital
37.8
11.7
18.3
5.6
39.3
11.4
19.5
5.7
Total
323.5
100.0
326.4
100.0
346.0
100.0
345.2
100.0
Notes: a. Data are divided by ATSIC between Torres Strait Regional Authority allocations and the rest
of the nation; these two components are aggregated here.
b. A distinction is made between annual allocations and annual releases. Since 1994, ATSIC
regional councils have been empowered to allocate the non-wages components and to shift
allocations between the recurrent and capital line items.
Source: CDEP Finance Sub-Section, ATSIC, Canberra
A problem with the on-costs component is that there are marked interstate
variations in these, especially workers' compensation insurance. A problem with
capital allocations, which is a severe limitation, is that there is no evidence that
these payments are tied to enterprise (or any other) performance; all too often, it
appears, these resources are distributed equally rather than equitably.
Administration of the CDEP scheme
One of the issues that has bedevilled the scheme since its establishment
and remains a major limitation is actual, or perceived, mal-administration.
Because all payments are notionally linked to participant numbers there is a need
to maintain accurate participant schedules. However, these only need to be
adjusted quarterly. This may explain the gap between participant numbers and
NATSIS estimates of CDEP employed. Structurally, because the scheme makes
payments to communities (via ATSIC) rather than to individuals (via Centrelink) it
is complex. It is unclear, for example, how much of additional income generated
by the scheme is just the result of strict application of 'no-work no-pay' rules (that
some communities use), or the result of mobility to other localities that generates
'salary savings', or the consequence of genuine income-generatingactivity.
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This complexity may have been exacerbated to some extent by the continual
pressures to decentralise decision making within ATSIC. Since 1994, while the
wages component of the scheme remains a national program, ATSIC regional
councils have been empowered to make annual allocations of recurrent on-costs
and capital components. Furthermore, regional councils have been allowed to
shift resources between these two categories, while participating communities
have been able to use any receipts (including enterprise earnings) for wages. This
development may explain some recent evidence (see below) that CDEP scheme
participants enjoy higher median incomes that welfare beneficiaries. It is unclear,
to date, how allocative decisions are being made by regional councils and whether
decentralisation has improved or detracted from the scheme's efficacy. What is
clear in Table 3 is that actual capital expenditure is well below allocations; this
suggests that either recurrent costs are consistently higher than anticipated or
that there is limited demand for capital.
The potential for mal-administratlon and periodic problems at the individual
community level has been termed by Rowse (1992) 'administrative anxiety'; it
remains the major factor that has driven ongoing audit reviews of the scheme over
the years (see Auditor-General 1990,1992. 1997; Australian National Audit Office
1995, 1997; Commonwealth of Australia 1996). It is a potential limitation that will
need to be addressed.
Challenges for the future
In looking to the future, unavoidable challenges that are facing indigenous affairs
generally, and the CDEP scheme in particular, are differentiated from the
avoidable. Some key challenges for the current (1997) review of the scheme are
also briefly highlighted.
The unavoidable: future population growth
Data In Indigenous affairs date quickly; In early 1997, Taylor and Altman
(1997) used Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) projections of the Indigenous
population at 319,000 In 1996,357,000 In 2001 and 398,000 in 2006. The
subsequent availability of the 1996Census-based estimated resident population
of 372,000 shows that this was a significant underestimate.4 Even using these
underestimates (in the absence of anything else) the indigenous population is
projected to grow at a rate of at least 2.6 per cent per annum and the population
of working age will be at least 30 per cent higher by 2006. The already dated best-
case scenario suggests that between 1996 and 2006 the indigenous official
unemployment rate is likely to Increase from the current estimated 37 per cent to
40 per cent.
Recently available census data Indicate that mainstream indigenous
employment totals 82,000 and CDEP employment is 18,622 (bearing in mind that
nearly 30 per cent of these participants are estimated to be either not working or
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not in the labour force). With CDEP at current levels, the indigenous
unemployment rate is 23 per cent; without the CDEP scheme, the unemployment
rate would increase to an estimated 40 per cent.
These statistics and potential for growth in the working-age population,
especially in rural and remote areas, will create enormous pressure to continue to
expand the scheme. Hunter and Taylor (1996) estimated that in the inter-censal
period 1986 to 1991, 64 per cent of employmentgrowth was explained by CDEP
scheme expansion; in the period 1991-96, a far lower 35 per cent of employment
growth is estimated to have been generated by expansion of the scheme (Altaian
1997). While the Howard Government's policy seeking urgent improvement in
private sector and enterprise employment outcomes for indigenous Australians is
laudatory, it still seems likely that in the short to medium terms the CDEP
scheme will require expansion just to maintain the already unacceptable status
quo (Altman 1997: 8-9; Taylor and Altaian 1997: 7). In particular, there may be a
need, again in accord with government policy, not to expand the scheme in those
geographic areas of fastest population growth (major urban areas), but rather to
expand the scheme in regions where mainstream labour markets are least vibrant
or, at times, moribund.
The avoidable: policy-linked, program-modification issues
There are a number of potential problems and challenges for the CDEP
scheme that are avoidable. Interestingly, though, in these areas there is a lack of
conclusive evidence about the performance of the scheme, irrespective of how it is
defined. Let us look at two specific issues.
First, there has been concern expressed in the literature over a number of
years (see, inter alia, Smith, Adams and Burgen 1990; Altman and Smith 1994)
that the scheme is locking participants into poverty. Conversely, there is a lack of
conclusive evidence that the scheme is improving individual income levels. This is
partly because all available data fails to rigorously differentiate scheme workers
from participants. Using 1991 Census data in a select sample of CDEP and non-
CDEP communities in the Northern Territory, Altman and Hunter (1996) were
unable to find any statistically significant differences in either mean or median
adult incomes irrespective of participation. Alternatively, using 1994 National
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey data, Sanders (1997a) shows that
scheme participation improves income outcomes. There is an urgent need for
close interrogation of 1996 Census data to assist in resolving such inconsistency,
but there are already some concerns that CDEP participants may not have been
sufficiently well differentiated to allow such an assessment, at least in non-remote
schemes.
Second, there is little evidence, especially in urban contexts, of individuals
exiting the scheme to employment, or even to work experience and training.
Smith's (1994, 1995, 1996) case studies each at one point in time indicate that
scheme workers may increase their employment (and incomes) by supplementing
scheme-funded work with other work. But there is little evidence of favourable
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employment outcomes. In 1992, a House of Representatives Report Mainly Urban
(Commonwealth of Australia 1992) recommended that in urban contexts the
scheme should have a sunset clause thus providing incentive for participants to
seek employment elsewhere. More recently, a survey conducted as part of a report
by ATSIC's Office of Evaluation and Audit (ATSIC 1997a) has argued that
employment outcomes for the CDEP scheme in urban contexts are positive and
are better than for long-term unemployed. This survey, based on post-
participation monitoring, is being challenged on statistical grounds by the
Department of Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs.
The lack of statistical and rigorous evidence of success is making the
scheme politically vulnerable. For example, while it can be argued that the loose
nexus between most CDEP scheme costs and welfare entitlements makes this
financial component of the scheme relatively safe, the recurrent on-costs and
capital components of the scheme that now cost nearly $90 million per annum,
are vulnerable to budget cuts. This is especially the case if these allocations are
just shown to be topping up wages. If there is no evidence that the scheme is
meeting its objectives, however defined, then the legitimate question whether the
additional cost of the scheme is justified can be raised. Unfortunately,
alternatively, if the scheme is shown to be successful, then potential for sunset
clauses and for less generous income testing arises. A political problem that may
arise in the indigenous domain without future expansion of the scheme is how
existing CDEP scheme resources should be allocated. Expansion that is currently
built into the scheme is only intended to cope with population growth at currently
participating communities; this limits options for the estimated 25,000 potential
indigenous participants in the scheme that are currently in receipt of NSA
(Hunter and Altaian 1996).
Challenges for the current review
By the time this discussion paper is available the 1997 review of the CDEP
scheme will either be completed or close to completion. Partly because this
review's terms of reference also require it to have regard to previous reviews of the
scheme it faces some unique challenges. In particular it is clear that considerably
more research is needed about the actual operations of the scheme. There is a
dearth of case study material about the scheme's current operations: those in No
Reverse Gear (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 1993) are now five years old and Smith's
(1994, 1995, 1996) three case studies are all urban based. There is an urgent
need for the review to devise appropriate performance indicators for the scheme
and it Is hoped that ATSIC's Central Office has been able to provide statistical
analysis of participants and that the ABS has been able to provide some
information from the 1996 Census where 12,000 indigenous people residing in
remote regions were characterised as CDEP scheme employed.
The key challenges facing the current review is to analyse previous reviews
and recommendations and assess why they were not implemented. Two
possibilities come to mind. First, there are enormous political and bureaucratic
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forces at work that seek to maintain the status quo, including regular expansion.
In recent years, as data in Table 1 indicate, the CDEP scheme has not only
become ATSIC's most significant program accounting for over 30 per cent of
expenditure, but it has also become its distinguishing cornerstone. Not
surprisingly, a degree of institutional protectiveness and possessiveness has built
up that can be hard to penetrate. Second, both for ATSIC and for government, the
existence of the scheme has become a political convenience. As already noted,
given pressures from projected growth of the working-age population, the scheme
will need to expand rapidly in the next decade just to maintain the indigenous
unemployment rate below 40 per cent. There is a growing realisation that in many
situations there are limited options for employment creation beyond the CDEP
scheme; unfortunately there is a possibility that the scheme will unwittingly
provide both government and ATSIC with a mechanism to avoid addressing the
'real' labour market situation of indigenous Australians. Developinga role for the
scheme in addressing this complex issue is the most difficult task facing the
current review team.
Conclusion
To summarise, looking back over the past 20 years, the major achievements of the
CDEP scheme would have to include, in no order of priority: its undiminished
popularity; its sheer survival; its ability to create a mechanism to facilitate
productive activity in many contexts; and its ability (and potential) to supplement
low cash incomes that would otherwise hit a very low welfare ceiling, especially in
remote, relatively underdeveloped, regions. Its limitations include the lack of
tangible and convincing evidence of success, be it in income supplementation,
employment creation, community development or enterprise creation; the absence
of well-defined exit options; and ongoing administrative problems, especially in
maintaining accurate participant schedules.
The future survival of the CDEP scheme is probably dependent, at least in
part, on a concerted government focus on the resolution of a number of marginal
eligibility issues (seeSanders 1997b). It may also be dependent on the relative
performance of the mainstream work-for-the-dole scheme as a benchmark that
may highlight the efficiency or inefficiency of the CDEP scheme. There is little
doubt that the scheme may need significant rejigging so that its employment
creation and income supplementation objectives can be clearly differentiated from
its income support and community development (welfare substitution) objectives.
There may also be growing pressure to clearly distinguish scheme
participants that work from non-working participants who are usually spouses of
workers. Addressing either of these two major issues may require some reduction
in the current independence afforded participating communities to decide how
CDEP scheme funding allocations are divided. While such community autonomy
is a major strength of the scheme from the indigenous perspective it is also
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resulting in a very wide diversity in outcomes that is making rigorous evaluation
and associated allocation of discretionary resources extremely problematic.
Notes
1. The enormous body of research about the scheme to 1993 Is summarised in an
annotated bibliography that is presented as a 25-page Appendix 3 to this report
(Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 1993).
2. Academic research at CAEPR about the scheme since the Centre's establishment in
1990 has been substantial, primarily because It is impossible to write about
Aboriginal economic policy or labour market participation without highlighting the
role of the CDEP scheme. CAEPR assessments of the scheme have been mixed, with
some of the most positive being three, all too rare, case studies by Smith (1994, 1995.
1996) that have examined urban CDEP schemes at Port Lincoln. Redfern and
Newcastle.
3. Arguably, since the establishment of the mainstream work-for-the-dole scheme the
strength of this argument has dissipated somewhat.
4. More recent indicative (and fairly conservative) estimates assuming a continuationof
the 1991-96 intercensal growth rate are 400,900 in 2001, 447,000 in 2006 and
497.200 in 2011 (see Gray 1997).
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